Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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States of affairs: is an expression for something that can be represented by a sentence. See also facts, situations, actions, objects, states, atomic sentences, protocol sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Roderick Chisholm on States of Affairs - Dictionary of Arguments
I 25f State of affairs/st.o.a/Chisholm: characterized by existence - but also impossible state of affairs: E.g. round-and-square - solution: whoever thinks it, thinks that it exists according to possibility - (he also thinks "There are quadrangles") - but no "unrealized possibilities". But: state of affairs exists like anything else! - non-composed state of affairs can be affirmative or negative. Negative state of affairs: if the property is not exemplified. I 64 Fact/fact/proposition/Chisholm: it is more natural to speak of accepting "propositions" than accepting facts. I 176 Fact/Chisholm: Definition involving: a involves b: whoever thinks a, thinks also b - Definition to contain: 1. if a exists, b also exists, 2. whoever accepts a, accepts b - E.g. a implies a v b, but does not involve it because you do not have to think a v b - a also does not include a v b, because you do not have to accept it - different with "and" -> intentional criteria for the identity of facts - >Conjunction/Chisholm, >Negation/Chisholm._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |